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ARGUMENT 
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S RESPONSE ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. THE APPLICABLE STATUTES AND CASES GOVERNING 
ABANDONMENT OF PUBLIC RIGHTS REQUIRE FORMAL ACTION IN 
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND DO NOT 
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN HIGHWAY EASEMENTS AND HIGHWAY RIGHTS-
OF-WAY IN FEE. 
The Appellant seeks to differentiate this case from the many Utah cases holding 
that abandonment of a highway requires an affirmative formal action by a public entity 
with authority. Appellant argues that the law is different if the road is located upon a 
right-of-way that is held in less than fee simple. This view is simply without any support 
by either the statutes or the cases that have been decided for most of the past 100 years. 
A. The statutory language. 
Utah Code Ann. § 36-1-3 (1943) provided "all highways once established must 
continue to be highways until abandoned by order of the board of county commissioners 
of the county in which they are situated, or other competent authority." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 27-1-3 (1953) provided "All highways once established must continue to be highways 
until abandoned by order of. . . competent authority." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102 
(additional provisions enacted in 1963) provided "The commission shall act to abandon 
any easement or to vacate any highway by resolution."; and Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105 
1 
(1999) "AH public highways once established shall continue until abandoned or 
vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction . . . ." This has been 
the rule in Utah since statehood with the exception of a period from about 1907 until 
1911 when a period of five years of non-use was itself sufficient to constitute 
abandonment1. 
It is not possible to insert into this broad and clear language a separate rule for an 
easement that is held in less than fee simple title. First, the language of the statute is plain 
and clear: it expressly refers to all highways in a generic way without qualification as to 
easements or title in fee. To differentiate between highways based on the nature of their 
title would be a significant departure from the common meaning of the wording used in 
these long standing statutes. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the standard 
rules of construction set forth at Utah Code § 68-3-11(2001); OSI Indus.. Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 381 (Utah Ct App. 1993); and State v. Hendrickson, 67 
Utah 15, 245 P. 375, 57 A.L.R. 786 (1926) requiring that statutory words be interpreted in 
accordance with their plain meaning. 
xThis was the law in effect when the case Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 126 P. 959, (Utah, 1912), 
was decided. The repeal of this provision evidences a clear intent, perhaps in response to the 
Tuttle decision, to change the law, and to no longer permit abandonment by non use. 
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The immediately preceding section in the same statutory chapter includes a section 
providing that rights-of-way can be acquired by ten years public use.2 Such easements 
established by adverse public use are not rights in fee, but only easements over the fee3. 
It would be inconsistent for the statute to create rights-of-way by public use that are less 
than fee, and not intend to include the same rights-of-way when in addressing the means 
of their being abandoned or vacated. Rather, the obvious construction is that the 
requirements for abandonment of highway rights-of-way apply without distinction to 
highways on fee and to those on less than fee. Appellant's argument does not have any 
place within the applicable statutory language. 
B. Utah case law. 
There have been numerous cases decided by the Utah court applying the statutes 
on abandonment of rights-of-way for public highways. The court has never created a 
judicial exception to the statutory requirements, based on the right-of-way being held in 
less than fee simple. 
Appellant has tried to use the distinction concerning title to support their argument 
that the law is different for this case. It is true that the nature of title to an easement may 
2Utah Code § 72-5-104; previously Utah Code § 27-12-89. 
3See for example Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947). 
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make a difference as to the effect of an abandonment of a highway. If a right-of-way not 
held in fee is abandoned by proper statutory action, then the effect of the abandonment is 
to revert title to the owner of the fee, whereas if the title is held in fee then the effect of 
the abandonment does not give title to the abutting land owner. But this distinction as to 
effect does not and never has been applied to modify the statutory requirement concerning 
the means of abandonment. Abandonment in either event requires compliance with the 
statute, and the statute requires formal action by the entity with jurisdiction. Appellant 
cites cases in support of their argument, that do not apply: either the statute was not the 
same at the time of the decision, the case did not involve a right-of-way for a public 
highway, or the cases are from other jurisdictions. This is a question of statutory 
interpretation of a Utah statute and out-of-state cases based on different statutes have no 
application. 
The only Utah case involving a highway right-of-way, Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 126 P. 
959, (Utah, 1912), was decided under a 1907 statute which for a brief 4 year period 
permitted a determination of abandonment based on five years of non-use. Even in that 
case, the issue was not the nature of the right-of-way but the evidence of non-use. The 
language quoted by Appellant in support of their argument from Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent 
Domain § 939, cites as its authority this early Utah case. The Am. Jur. statement quoted 
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is directly contrary to the law as contained in all subsequent Utah statutes and in the 
current Utah statute. The statutory language upon which the decision was based, was 
changed shortly before the appellate decision in Turtle, supra and was apparently changed 
to preclude abandonment by non-use. 
Many of the cases cited by Appellee in support of its argument, are cases of roads 
established by public use. For example see Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595 (Utah 
1974); and Western Kane County Special Service District No.l v. Jackson Cattle 
Company, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). As has been noted these road rights-of-way are 
not rights acquired in fee, but easements across the underlying fee; see Premium Oil Co., 
supra. The court has applied the statute with equal force to such rights-of-way. If there 
were to be a distinction between roads acquired in fee and roads acquired by easement, it 
would be expected to arise in the context of such easements created by operation of law 
since it would be reasonable that the rights of an underlying fee owner would be 
considered greater when an easement is acquired by such acts of public use, rather than by 
purchase and express grant of an easement from the owner. However, these cases have 
uniformly upheld the application of the statute to such easements. If the rule applies 
equally to such easements created by implication, it should certainly apply to easements 
created by deed where consideration was paid. 
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The public policy for such uniform application of the statute is based in part on 
the judicially recognized need for a public process when disposing of public rights. 
Courts have recognized the wisdom of requiring affirmative and formal acts of a public 
official when eliminating a public right, to such an extent as to preclude adverse 
possession of public land; see Averett v. Utah County Drainage Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 428 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Such a rule is preferable to one permitting loss of a public right 
due to the vagaries of time and memory, the ambiguities of public and private actions, and 
the potential for abuse or fraud. The safer rule is to require evidence that an agency with 
jurisdiction has taken the required affirmative action before finding a public right-of-way 
to be terminated. This policy should not be less, if the highway right-of-way is held by 
an easement rather than fee. The same reasoning applies. As was stated in the decision of 
Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1, supra (a road established by public 
use was not used and another route was used instead, for more than 50 years) it is 
necessary that the "strict statutory procedure be followed for the vacation of a public 
road." Id. at 1378. 
Olsen v. Board of Education.571 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1977) is the only other Utah 
case cited by Appellants as authority for the distinction involving title. This was not a 
highway case and consequently the statute at issue in this case is not applicable and the 
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decision does not provide authority. The case involved the interpretation of a deed with a 
conditions subsequent, not rights-of-way used by the public for highway purposes.. 
2. APPELLANT MISREPRESENTS THE FACTS IN SUPPORT OF 
THE ALLEGED ABANDONMENT, AND THIS FACTUAL DISPUTE 
ILLUSTRATES AND SUPPORTS THE NEED FOR STRICT ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE STATUTORY RULE REQUIRING FORMAL ACTION BY THE 
AGENCY. 
Appellant asserts inter alia that the land within the 1936 Right-of-way was fenced 
after 1951, that the land was not used as a highway after 1951, and that the land was re-
acquired in the 1951 condemnation and in a later 1967 condemnation. (Appellant's Reply 
Brief at 17.) Each of these allegations are misleading or false. The actual facts show that 
the 1951 fence was located along a line equal distant from the highway surface consistent 
with the limited access nature of the highway, which line did not correspond with the 
centerline nor with either boundary of the allegedly abandoned 1936 right-of-way.(R at 
252 and 258.) In the 1951 condemnation the reason for retaining the land and acquiring 
additional land at the corner of Old Mountain Road and the new highway alignment was 
challenged. UDOT's engineer testified that the highway purposes for the acquisition (and 
by implication the reason for retention of the adjacent right-of-way) was to preserve it for 
future highway expansion, to preclude development requiring dangerous access near the 
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intersection, and to prevent short-cutting across the property in order to protect public 
safety. (R at 378 to 384.) The language of the deed is that the land was to be used for 
"highway purposes" not as a highway. Finally, the subsequent condemnations did not 
acquire the land already within the right-of-way, but explicitly and carefully excluded the 
land in the 1936 deed when calculating the amount to be paid (see the right-of-way 
contacts R at 145 and 152, Appellee's Brief at 10 f.n. 4 and 5.) As previously argued in 
the Appellee's Brief on cross appeal, the exclusion of the land in the existing right-of-way 
demonstrates that the land was not considered abandoned. 
This recitation of the disputed facts in this case demonstrates the reason for the 
statutory requirement for a formal act of abandonment by an entity with jurisdiction. It 
illustrates the endless number of circumstances where the State would continually be 
defending itself against such claims. The evidence was undisputed that there had 
never been a deed or other action by UDOT abandoning the right-of-way. (R. at 
268). There was never even such a claim. Strict adherence to the statutory requirement 
that there be such a deed or action, will avoid innumerable disputes relying on long-cold 
memories, on disputed interpretation of events, or willful misrepresentation. The statute 
was intended to protect the public investment in the state's highway rights-of-way. Such 
a purpose is sound, clear, and should be followed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The testimony of the witnesses was undisputed that the 1936 Right-of-Way has not 
been vacated or abandoned in accordance with Utah Code §72-5-105 (1999) and its 
predecessors. The court erred in considering the possible evidence of actions of 
abandonment. The requirement for formal action should not ignored, and a judicial 
exception should not be created. Since the right-of-way that was acquired in 1936 has 
not been abandoned as required by statute, UDOT should not need to re-acquire it in this 
action. 
Respectfully submitted this f^?3ay of January, 2002 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
- ^ U : ? CUM)*, 
STEVEN F. ALDER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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